Updated on July
21, 2001
The KSE-100 Index dropped by 52 points to close at
1260 on Friday, July 20 versus previous weeks' close at 1312 on July
13. Between June 15 to July 18, the Index had already lost 100 points
YTD, the Pakistani market is down 16%, making it one of the worst
performing markets in Asia so far in 2001, along with India and Hong
Kong.
Unlike Hong Kong where fears about the dollar-peg
and macro-level impact of Argentinean financial crisis have hit
sentiments, the fall of markets in the Sub-Continent has been due not
only to foreign selling pressure but also homegrown issues. The
commencement of T+5 and T+3 rolling settlement systems in India and
Pakistan respectively, has massively hit volumes (i.e. speculative
activity) in both countries. In India the UTI crises in the largest
US-64 mutual fund has compounded negative investor sentiment. In the
case of Pakistan, the sheer lack of depth in the stock market and
unregulated badla financing in the past few months appear to be the
main cause of current woes. The last 150 points of the prolonged
decline in the KSE-100 since 1Q01 can be chronicled and analyzed as
follows:
•1Q01= Morgan Stanley Pakistan Fund sells out a
part of liquidation of its Pakistan Fund Investment Portfolio amount
is approximately US$35-40mn or about PkR2.3bn.
•1Q01= Domestic financial institutions and brokerages raise the
quantum of badla financing. Badla volumes begin climbing back to
Rs.5bn levels. At the same time, the SECP disallows blank selling and
puts further restrictions on short sales.
•2Q01= Foreign selling continues as MSCIís free float index halves
Pakistan's already tiny weight in its universe. Generalist global
investors and remaining index funds sell out of Pakistan stocks.
•2Q01= Domestic financial institutions, seeing the continual selling
step away from the BUY side and instead begin to get even more
aggressively involved in the badla business, which gives them a clear
spread of 4-6% on their cost of bulk funds. This allows weak-holders
to continue building position and foreigners to continue exiting at
higher levels. Contrarian investors who used to take a bearish stand
and push market down sharply are unable to do so thus creating
artificial sense of security for badla financed weak-holders.
•3Q01= T+3 commences, foreign selling continues in bouts and
financial institutions now begin to get nervous about weak-holders'
ability to hold on to their shares. Regulators push some large players
to reduce long-positions. Prudential Bank crisis erupts and several
heavy speculative brokerage houses come under NAB investigation. Weak
holders now panic and brokerage houses force several large ones to
liquidate positions.
•3Q01= Unrealistically optimistic expectations about the Agra Summit
remain unfulfilled and market sentiment turns very negative. Despite
the market moving to a lower zone of neutral territory, players simply
dump their trading holdings. The market falls around 150 points over a
5-week period ending on Friday, July 20, 2001.
Now had the financial institutions and brokerage
houses not jumped onto the bandwagon of badla financing so
aggressively in 1Q01, and instead gone into the stocks themselves, the
huge excess of scrip liquidity would not have built up in the first
place.
Which brings us to the next part:
What next?
There are several questions to be addressed
regarding future outlook of the market.
1. Will the foreign selling continue and if
so, how much and for how long?
2. Will the recent sell-off significantly reduce badla
financing so that genuine investors can slowly begin accumulation?
3. Are market fundamentals in term of corporate earnings
outlook and stock valuations now sufficiently attractive for
longer-term investors to even look seriously at Pakistani equities at
this point in time?
4. Will the T+3 system in itself come under scrutiny as far as
exchanges are concerned, given the sharp reduction in trading volumes
and thus concurrent fall in brokerage commission income?
5. Will the change in tax rules on dividends lead to a
significant fall in payments by the corporate sector and thus
permanently damage domestic investors' interest in locally listed
stocks? This begs a more fundamental question: Do dividends (dividend
policies) matter?
6. What should investors do going forward from here, in the
light of the issues raised above?
Sector Review
Oil Marketing Companies- FY01 Earnings Preview
The FY01 results season for OMC's will soon be upon
us. Thus while the overall market continues to be under pressure due
to various technical and regulatory (T+3) reasons, it may be a good
time to assess how the OMC sector has performed in FY01 and what is
the likely outlook for FY02 earnings.
Before we start discussing the financial results of
the OMC sector, we might want to take a look at some important drivers
of growth for the sector. The OMC sector growth is dependent upon two
main drivers, as follows:
1. Consumer Prices: The GoP has recently
allowed the OMCs to set end consumer prices with but the gross margins
still fixed. The end-prices (consumer) are officially set by Oil
Companies Advisory Committee (OCAC), but with government maintaining
indirect control via indicating max limits, except for lubricants.
Thus while prices are likely to follow international petroleum price
trends, there would be lags and not necessarily a close correlation at
all times.
2. Volume: Change in volume sales by a company (PSO, SHELL,
CALTEX) flows directly to the bottom line thus enhancing the return to
its shareholders. The volume of sales is in turn dependent on the
demand for POL products. The demand for the POL products is directly
driven by the economic activity. A slow down in economic activity
results in declining sales volumes for the OMCs and vice versa. The
major demand generating sectors for the POL products in Pakistan are
Power and Cement (FO), Transport (HSD) and Industrial Lubricants
consumers.
a) Power sector in Pakistan has always been
the major consumer of furnace oil (FO) with 75.6% of total volumes
sold in the market in 2000 alone. The main supplier, PSO, controls
over 90% of the market share in FO due to its large infrastructure and
storage capacities. Due to the rise in international oil prices, the
cost to import oil has also risen considerably. In 2000 alone, the
total imports stood at US$10bn with cost of petroleum imports at
US$3.0bn or 30% of the total. This prompted the GoP to look at
alternative source of energy — natural gas and coal. In our opinion,
the shift from oil to natural gas by power sector companies would
seriously hamper the sales of PSO, going forward. On the other hand
Shell, which has a much smaller share of the FO market, is relatively
more insulated to this change in FO demand.
The cement sector, which consumes around 1.6mn
tonnes of FO, has also been asked by the GoP to shift its focus from
FO to coal for heating the kiln. We believe these moves would have a
negative impact on long-term demand for FO — and the implication is
that PSO might be hurt more than Shell and Caltex.
b) The transport sector of course is a major
demand driver of the OMCs. Demand by the transport sector for High
Speed Diesel (HSD) is linked closely to the agricultural activity in
the country. Transport sector's demand for HSD stood at 94.47% of
total consumed in 2000. PSO controls over 60% of the market share in
HSD where as the rest lies with Shell and Caltex (not listed). Here,
we believe that PSO, with its larger market share and storage
capacities, has an advantage over its competitors. As against power
and cement sectors, the transport sector led demand for HSD could
prove to be the main driver of sales growth for the OMCs.
c) The OMCs focus aggressively on Industrial
consumers of Lubricants for increase in their net profits. Growth in
demand of Industrial lubricants occurs mainly on the back of higher
economic activity. With no controls by the government on end consumer
prices, the companies compete aggressively in increasing their market
share. Shell, we believe, has an advantage over PSO with its
international expertise whereas PSO has been struggling lately to keep
its existing market share, as competition from new sources (BP-Amoco,
PARCO) has also started.
| ASIA PACIFIC & AUSTRALIA |
| EXCHANGE |
INDEX |
LEVEL |
CHANGE |
EXCHANGE |
|
Bombay |
BSE |
3340.75 |
-30.18 |
-0.90% |
|
Hong Kong |
Hang Seng |
12301.7 |
+21.86 |
0.18% |
|
Singapore |
Straits Times |
1638.08 |
+11.24 |
0.69% |
|
Sydney |
S&P ASX 200 |
3384.2 |
-10.20 |
-0.30% |
|
Tokyo |
Nikkei |
11908.4 |
+15.81 |
0.13% |
|
Frankfurt |
DAX |
5764.06 |
-65.63 |
-1.13% |
|
London |
FTSE |
5387.1 |
-50.30 |
-0.93% |
|
Paris |
CAC |
4880.7 |
-49.69 |
-1.01% |
|
Dow Jones |
Industrial |
10576.65 |
-33.35 |
|
|
nasdaq |
Composite |
2029.37 |
-17.22 |
|
|
|
.
|
|
| |
Last
week |
This
Week |
%Change |
|
Mkt. Cap (US $ bn) |
5.15 |
4.99 |
-3.11 |
|
Total Turnover (mn shares) |
308.87 |
244.07 |
-20.98 |
|
Value Traded (US$ mn.) |
230.93 |
144.58 |
-37.39 |
|
No. of Trading Sessions |
5 |
5 |
|
|
Avg. Dly T/O (mn. shares) |
61.77 |
48.81 |
-20.98 |
|
Avg. Dly T/O (US$ mn) |
46.19 |
28.92 |
-37.39 |
|
KSE 100 Index |
1312.10 |
1260.16 |
-3.96 |
|
KSE All Share Index |
839.90 |
810.83 |
-3.46 |
|